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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TITLE VII-INDIAN
HIRING PREFERENCE DOES NOT CONTRAVENE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 147 (1979).

INTRODUCTION

A prime objective of Title VII legislation is to eliminate
discrimination in employment by removing barriers to equal
employment opportunities.' Indians are excluded from the mandate
of Title VII by section 2000e-2(i) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
which creates a hiring preference for Indians with respect to certain
jobs on or near an Indian reservation. 2 A recent Tenth Circuit deci1. "The purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is to eliminate discrimination in
employment based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine
& Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The intent of Congress in enacting Title VII
was to bring the entire scope of the working environment within the protective ambit of the
Act. Thus, liberal interpretation of Title VII by the courts is required to effectuate this congressional intent. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
It should be noted that courts will construe Title VII liberally to eliminate employment
policies which subvert the underlying purposes of Title VII even though there is not a conventional employer-employee relationship. See Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338
(D.C. Cir. 1973), where the court was faced with the question of whether a hospital that
allegedly refused to refer a male private duty nurse's name to female patients who had requested private nursing services was an employer within the meaning of Title VII. The court
said:
To permit a covered employer to exploit circumstances peculiarly affording it the
capability of discriminatorily interfering with an individual's employment
opportunities with another employer, while it could not do so with respect to
employment in its own service, would be to condone continued use of the very
criteria for employment that Congress has prohibited.
Id. at 1341.
In Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974), a
driver-trainer of harness horses sued the regulatory agency which was responsible for horse
racing activity in New Hampshire and the New Hampshire Trotting and Breeding Association,
Inc., which conducts harness racing activities. The plaintiiff claimed the defendants had
deprived him of employment opportunities because of his Italian national origin. The court
held that the defendants were employers within the contemplation of the equal employment
provisions of Title VII because they controlled the licensing of and stall space for drivertrainers; in so holding the court said the statutory language in Title VII is broad and should not
be construed narrowly.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1976). This section provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business or enterprise on
or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced employment practice of such business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment
is given to any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation.
This section is also known as section 703(i) of Title VII, but will be referred to in this Casenote
as either section 2000e-2(i) or the Indian preference exception.
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sion relied on this Indian preference exception to Title VII as a basis
for thwarting a fourteenth amendment claim of racial discrimination. 3
LITIGATION
Paul and Sara Livingston, a non-Indian couple, challenged state'
and municipal' policies which allow only Indians to sell arts and
3. Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d I 10 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 147 (1979).
4. The state policy as adopted by the Museum Board of Regents reads in part:
I. Other than during annually scheduled markets, no person nor group of
persons will be permitted to display or sell merchandise on the grounds
belonging to the Museum of New Mexico with the sole exception that the area
under the portal in front of the Palace of the Governors may be used by Indians to display and sell arts and crafts produced by hand by Indian artists
and craftsmen.
2. Permission to use the area under the portal is granted to the Indians with the
express understanding that the Indians themselves are solely responsible for
the fair and orderly regulation of the use of that space. In the event that the
Indians fail to maintain a fair and orderly market under the portal, the
Regents will withdraw the permission granted herein and no display or sale of
goods whatsoever will be permitted on any grounds belonging to the
Museum.
3. The Museum hereby withdraws all permissions heretofore granted to display
or sell any merchandise on any other grounds belonging to the Museum.
4. The Director of the Museum shall have the authority to request the assistance
of municipal law-enforcement officers to enforce the policy set forth herein.
5. This statement of policy precedes all previous statement [sic] of policy
concerning the display and sale of merchandise on the grounds of the
Museum of New Mexico.
Museum Bd. of Regents, Public Policy on Sales on Museum Grounds (Feb. 18, 1976).
5. The relevant municipal policy is stated by the Santa Fe City Council in Resolution No.
1975-23, § 4:
Street Vendors: Permit for sales activity on public streets may be approved by
the City Manager provided that:
(a) Use of no parking zones, loading zones, and metered parking spaces shall
be prohibited beyond the allowable parking time in that space.
(b) Vendors shall not be permitted to locate adjacent to City parks during
events scheduled by the City of Santa Fe Recreation Department, or on the Plaza
during scheduled annual events.
(c) Loudspeakers and other undue noise such as yelling shall be prohibited.
(d) Sales shall be prohibited within 500 feet of any established business offering for sale the type of wares offered by the street vendor.
(e) In any calendar year, no more than five (5) vendors selling food or drink
items and five (5) vendors selling non-food or drink items shall be permitted.
(f) Other than in conjunction with the Plaza uses in Section 5 below, no street
vendors shall be permitted on the Plaza.
Santa Fe, N.M., Res. 1975-23, § 4.
There is no specific reference in the resolution concerning the portal Indians. Yet the portal
Indians are not only allowed to sell under the portal on the Plaza as an apparent exception to
this policy, but also do not have to obtain a license. Non-Indian licensees, however, may not
sell on the Plaza. Their licenses are stamped with the words "This Excludes Plaza Area."
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crafts under the Museum portal of the Palace of the Governors in

Santa Fe, New Mexico. 6 The Livingstons alleged that those policies
created an unjustified racial classification which contravened the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' The district
court granted summary judgment for the state, holding that the state
and municipal policies were based on a cultural classification that
did not violate the Livingston's right to equal protection. 8 The
district court said a trust relationship existed between the state and
the Indians.9
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
Although the Livingstons violated this resolution and the Museum policy, they were never
charged with those violations. Instead, Paul Livingston was arrested for assault-"impugning
the delicacy or honor" of an Indian. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3-1(C) (1978). The charge was eventually dropped.
One should also note that the relevant municipal policy is a resolution and not an ordinance.
Thus, it is unlikely that criminal sanctions could have been imposed on the Livingstons if they
had been arrested for this reason.
6. The historic Palace of the Governors in Santa Fe is said to be the oldest public building in
the United States. The Museum was established in 1909, and is under the control of the
Museum Board of Regents. The portal is the patio portion of the Palace of the Governors and
is thus under the control of the Regents. When the Museum was created, it was dedicated to the
presentation and preservation of New Mexico's multicultural traditions.
The history of the Museum, which is described in the district court opinion, is interesting.
The Palace of the Governors has historically been visited by tourists and used for various purposes by several cultural groups. The Pueblo Indians occupied the Palace after the Pueblo
Revolt of 1680-1693, and after the Reconquest by the Spaniards, the Indians sought justice
from the governors who lived there in disputes over land, water, and personal rights. In addition, the Indians traveled to the Palace to sell food and miscellaneous wares. The plaza area
was used as a market place by both Hispanics and Pueblo Indians after the Spanish conquest;
later, white traders and businessmen established shops in the Plaza. Sometime prior to 1853,
several ethnic groups began to use the portal as a public market place. By 1909, the non-Indian
groups had largely abandoned the portal and only the Indian market remained. In 1935, the
Museum began to permit only Indians to use the space in the portal for the sale of their arts and
crafts. At that time, by agreement with the Museum, the New Mexico Association of Indian
Affairs sponsored an Indian Market under the portal. It was discontinued during World War
Ii, but immediately thereafter the Museum permitted exclusive year-round use of the portal by
the Indians. This practice has been in effect since that time, but was only formalized as
Museum policy by the Regents in 1972. In February, 1976, a written policy statement was
issued to insure that no vendors except the Indians would be allowed to sell on Museum property. Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp. 825 (D.N.M. 1978).
7. The Livingstons predicated their argument on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. They contended that the Museum policy discriminated against them
because they are non-Indians. They also argued that their rights of free expression and
assembly under the first and fourteenth amendments were abridged. Neither the district court
nor the Tenth Circuit considered the first amendment argument in their opinions.
8. Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp. 825, 830, 832 (D.N.M. 1978).
9. Id. at 832. See also text accompanying note 10 infra. The "trust relationship" referred to
in the district court opinion refers to the unique relationship the Indian tribes have with the
federal government. They are independent political communities which retain their original
natural rights in matters of local self-government. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978) (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)). A tribe is a distinct people
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summary judgment, but did not adopt its reasoning.'" The court of
having the power to regulate its internal and social relations. United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375 (1886).
Although they no longer possess full sovereignty, tribes have a semi-independent status.
States are also regarded as semi-independent entities, but a tribe's relationship with the federal
government is not analogous to that of a state's with the federal government. The relationship
between Indian tribes and the federal government is not one of contract, where each party is
capable of protecting his own interests, but rather one of guardian and ward, with the Indians
existing in a state of dependency and pupilage under the federal government's care and protection. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 437 (1903). Although Indian tribes have this
special relationship with the federal government, Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975);
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), they are subject to the paramount authority of the United States.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). The
federal government's plenary power has preempted most of the field of Indian affairs and has
precluded state interference with the relationship between tribes and the federal government.
State laws concerning Indians, which are enacted under the explicit federal legislative authority, are, however, deemed to be valid expressions of the federal trust responsibility.
With this background in mind, the district court used Indian equal protection analysis to
decide the case. Under Indian equal protection law, legislation that confers preferential treatment to Indian tribes is upheld if it fulfills the obligations owed by the federal government to
Indian tribes or if it furthers Indian self-government. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
Such cases are not analyzed under the strict scrutiny test required in cases involving racial
classifications. The strict scrutiny doctrineirWavoided by characterizing Indian/non-Indian
classifications as political or cultural rather than racial, and by according the federal government special deference in the area of Indian legislation. Id. Under the equal protection analysis
applicable to tribal Indians, the court first examines the legislation to ascertain if it is intended
to benefit the federal government's trust relationship with Indian tribes: if so, the court then
decides whether the legislation is rationally tied to the fulfillment of the government's obligation toward them. The standard of review employed is far less stringent than the strict scrutiny
standard, but somewhat greater than minimal scrutiny. Using this analysis, the district court
concluded that the Livingstons had failed to establish that any fundamental right was violated
by the Museum policy. For a more in-depth analysis of Indian equal protection, see Johnson &
Crystal, Indiansand EqualProtection, 54 Wash. L. Rev. 587 (1979).
10. There is a good reason why the Tenth Circuit did not follow the district court's reasoning. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has recognized a trust relationship between
Indians and states. However, the district court opinion specifically recognized the existence of
a trust relationship between Indians and states, inferred from the existence of the special relationship of the Indians with the federal government.
The uncontroverted facts in this case show a direct link between the portal policy
and the economic survival of several pueblos. Indian self-determination is meaningless if opportunities for self-support are destroyed. Therefore, it is clear that
the policy is intimately and directly related to this one very legitimate, racially
neutral state interest. If, as Mancari holds, such an interest is legitimate, and a
preference for Indians is constitutional for the federal government through the
BIA, then the same must be true of a state government through one of its state
owned museums.
455 F. Supp. at 832 (emphasis added). By avoiding the equal protection claim, the Tenth Circuit circumvented a host of complex problems that would flow from a holding recognizing a
state/Indian trust relationship. Specifically, is a trust relationship between tribes and states
valid? Do any treaties or federal laws apply in this situation? If not, then perhaps a standard
equal protection analysis should apply. What role should the state play in the relationship between the federal government and tribes, and to what extent do state constitutions and laws
apply to Indians?
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appeals decided the case under section 2000e-2(i) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964," classifying it as an employment case under Title VII to
which the Indian preference exception fully applied. I2 Interestingly,
the state never argued that the Indian preference exception to Title
VII applied,' 3 and the Livingstons maintained that this was not an
employment case.' 4 The Title VII exception was brought to the
court's attention by three individual portal Indians who intervened
and argued that the Indian preference provision in Title VII was
dispositive of the case.' 5 This argument became the cornerstone of
the Tenth Circuit's opinion.
HOW THE COURT APPLIED TITLE VII
The court of appeals took two steps before applying the Indian
preference exception to Title VII. First, the court recast the legal
theory on which the Livingstons' case was based. The Livingstons
alleged that, in violation of their equal protection rights under the
11.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1976). This provision was specially drafted and inserted into
2000e to protect the Indians by exempting them from the operation of Title VII. Senator
Mundt's statement illustrates the purposes behind the enactment of this provision.
Mr. President, in the Civil Rights bill as presently before us, it has been brought
to my attention that one aspect of the legislation which has not been adequately
defined, could, in fact, cause this bill to work a new hardship and economic
discrimination against our American Indians.
Thus, unless this phase of the legislation is corrected, the segment of our
American economy now meriting the most assistance and having the greatest
needs will receive another setback instead of receiving favorable consideration.
This program can succeed only by giving our Indians a special employment status and opportunity on these on-reservation economic ventures.
110 Cong. Rec. 9615 (1964).
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) is the most forceful judicial recognition of special
policies favoring Indian tribes. In Mancari non-Indian Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
employees asked the Supreme Court to affirm a lower court holding that the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 implicitly repealed the Indian preference statutes. The plea was
denied. Instead, the Court used Indian equal protection analysis to sustain the constitutional
validity of the preference system.
12. Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 147 (1979).
13. The state admitted that the classification established by the Museum policy was racial,
but asserted that such a classification was not unconstitutional. Brief of Appellees at 2, 7, 10,
13, 14, 15 & 17, 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 147 (1979). It is noteworthy
that the Supreme Court, in a 1974 decision, had characterized a BIA preference for Indians as
"political, not racial." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553, n.24. Had a racial classification
been found, the charge that it was inherently unreasonable and constitutionally invalid would
have been infinitely more difficult to rebut.
14. Brief of Appellant at 36, 37 & 51 and Reply Brief of Appellants at 18-21,601 F.2d 1110
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100S. Ct. 147 (1979).
15. Answer Brief of Intervenors-Appellees at 17-26, 601 F.2d 1i10 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 147 (1979).
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fourteenth amendment, they were refused permission to sell under
the portal because they were non-Indians. The district court decided
the case on this theory. The Tenth Circuit, however, characterized
6
the Livingstons' theory as an equal employment opportunity claim. I
Second, the court found that an "employment relationship" existed
between the Museum and the Indians. Once the court found that
such an "employment relationship" existed, the Indian preference
exception to Title VII could be applied.'"
Three conditions must be met before the Indian preference exception can be applied.' 8 First, the employer must be a business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation. The Santa Fe Museum portal
area, though not on a reservation, is less than ten miles away from
an Indian pueblo and therefore meets the requirement of the provision.' Second, the Indian must live "on or near" a reservation."
This requirement is designed to bring unassimilated Indians who
maintain close economic, social, and cultural ties to a reservation
within the protection of the provision. 2' The majority of portal In-

dians come from nearby pueblos. 2 Finally, an employment practice
which gives preference to Indians must exist. An employment practice presupposes the existence of an employer-employee nexus. 23
There need not be a conventional employer-employee relationship
for Title VII to apply, but some type of employment relationship
must exist because the practices addressed by Title VII arise in the
employment setting. 4
16. It is not unusual for a court to decide a case on a legal theory other than the one propounded in the complaint. The main purpose of pleadings is to give notice to the other party
that the complaining party has a grievance against him. The Tenth Circuit had good reason to
adopt another legal theory. See note l0supra. It should be noted that the Tenth Circuit, in dictum, said that if it were to consider the case as a possible reverse discrimination violation, it
would conclude that no violation had been demonstrated.
17. The court properly applied the Title VII exception in this case because the 1972 amendments to Title VII bring state action within the mandate of the statute. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). Note too that the Indian preference exception
to Title VII has been held by the Supreme Court to be constitutional. Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1975).
18. The three conditions are contained in the provision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1976).
19. Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d at 1115.
20. The BIA has frequently indicated in hearings before Congress that living "on or near" a
reservation equates with living "on" it for purposes of welfare service eligibility. Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 213-30 (1974).
21. Id. Congress intended to include Indians who maintain close ties with a reservation community within the Title VII exemption provision. See generally 110 Cong. Rec. 9615 (1964).
22. The record clearly shows that most of the Indian sellers are from nearby pueblos. See
Answer Brief of Intervenors-Appellees at 21.
23. See Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Puntolillo v.
New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974).
24. Vanguard Justice Soc'y, Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670 (D. Md. 1979).
Throughout the Act and the applicable federal regulations, an intent to deal with
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The Tenth Circuit concluded that there was a sufficient employment relationship between the Museum and the Indians to invoke
Section 2000e-2(i). 25 Three leading cases indicate that the term
"employer," as used in Title VII, will apply to any party who significantly affects the access of any individual to employment opportunities or' job markets, regardless of whether that party technically
26
may be described as an "employer" as defined at common law.
Viewed in this manner, the policy granting permission to the Indians
to use the portal area seems to involve the Museum sufficiently in the
total employment process so that it may be considered an employer
for purposes of Title VII.
On the other hand, there were facts which indicated that an
employment relationship did not exist. The portal Indians were not
paid a salary by the Museum. They could come and go as they
wished. There was no contract or other arrangement between them,
and the Museum did not keep a list of names and addresses of persons selling under the portal.2 7 When asked what an Indian must do
to obtain the privilege of selling under the portal, the director of the
Museum replied, "Arrive."" These facts indicate that the portal
selling privilage is not a means of controlling access to a job market,
but rather a conditional grant of power to the Indians to control
employment under the portal with a reversionary interest in the
Museum should "the Indians fail to maintain a fair and orderly
market under the portal." 2 9 Furthermore, the selling privilege is not
limited to New Mexico Indians.3 0 Conceivably all Indians selling
under the portal could be from another state without violating the
Museum policy, a condition which may, however, violate the "on or
near a reservation" condition required for the Indian preference
exception. 3'
more than the conventional employer-employee situation is indicated. This intent is demonstrated by the specific prohibition against discrimination by
employment agencies and labor organizations, and by the prohibition of
discrimination against individuals ....
Id. at 694.
25. The Tenth Circuit did not fully explain why it found that an employment practice existed. The court merely recognized that the Museum-Indian arrangement was not a conventional employer-employee relationship, noted that the concept is broadly construed, and then
concluded that one existed in the case at bar. 601 F.2d at 1114.
26. Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Curran v. Portland
Superintending School Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 1063 (D. Me. 1977); Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974).
27. Deposition of George Ewing at 13-14, 455 F. Supp. 825 (D.N.M. 1978).
28. Id. at 14.
29. See note 4 supra, at 2.
30. There is no such restriction in the Museum policy. See note 4supra.
31. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
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The Museum may not be an employer within the meaning of Title
VII. Sibley3" Memorial Hospital v. Wilson and Puntolillo"l v. New
Hampshire Racing Commission cases were cited by the Tenth Circuit in support of its holding.3 ' Those cases, however, involved proprietary or private functions," whereas in Livingston the Museum
policy serves to regulate access to what is essentially a public accommodation. Courts have held that governmental bodies are not
employers within the meaning of Title VII when exercising other
types of regulatory functions."6
In addition, applying only Title VII to the Livingston case may
create a conflict with the public accommodation laws of Title II, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a, which guarantees all people equal access to any
public accommodation without regard torace.' 7 The Museum meets
the definition of a public accommodation under § 2000a(b)(3). 38
Unlike the Title VII exception, there is no provision in Title II which
grants Indians a special exemption. It can therefore be argued that
Title VII should not control a case such as Livingston where the
employment opportunity also involves access to a public accommodation.
32. 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
33. 375 F. Supp. 1089(D.N.H. 1974).
34. 601 F.2d at 1114-15.
35. Lavender-Cabellero v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 458 F. Supp. 213, 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (citing Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973)); Puntolillo v.
New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974). See note I supra.
For example, in Puntolillo an employment relationship was found even though one defendant was a state regulatory agency. That agency, however, along with the other defendant,
asserted direct control over day-to-day actions of the driver-trainers to the extent that it controlled the driver-trainers' ability to earn a living. The Museum does not have that degree of
control over the Indians; it cannot prohibit them from selling their arts and crafts elsewhere.
36. Lavender-Cabellero v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 458 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
See Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976);
Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 420 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Va. 1976); aff'd, 598 F.2d
1345 (4th Cir. 1979).
37.. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1976) says: "All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any
place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1976) provides:
Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter if its operations affect
commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action:
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium
or other place of exhibition or entertainment. ...
(Emphasis added.)
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IMPLICATIONS
The Tenth Circuit opinion, by relying on Title VII, sidestepped the
issue of whether a trust relationship exists between states and Indians." Although the court wisely avoided a thorny issue, its extension of the Indian preference exception to Title VII also leaves some
questions unanswered."
JOSEPH LEE WERNTZ III

39. See notes 9-10supra.
40. One question which arises is how far may an Indian be from a reservation and still be
considered "on or near" a reservation? See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 213-30 (1974).
In the author's opinion, this case illustrates the inherent irony of Title VII legislation. An important objective of Title VII is to eliminate prejudice against any employee, including Indians;
yet, section 2000e-2(i) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically exempts the Indians from the
mandate of the Act. While the Title VII preference is intended to be used by Indians to protect
their employment opportunities "on or near" a reservation, it may not have been the framers'
intent that Indians be allowed to use the preference to deny other individuals a share in that
same opportunity.
According to the testimony of Museum Director George Ewing there are a variety of spaces
that go unused under the portal for most of the year. Deposition of George Ewing at 15-16.
Ideally some peaceful arrangement could be worked out among the parties where non-Indians
may sell in the unused spaces under the portal while the Museum continues to further the important interest of preserving and encouraging the sale of traditional Indian arts and crafts.

